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ABSTRACT
We show how to use multilevel modeling and post-stratification to
estimate legislative outcomes under counterfactual representation
schemes that e.g. boost the representation of women or translate
votes into seats differently. We apply this technique to two research
questions: (1) Would the U.S. Congress be less polarized if state
delegations were formed according to the principle of party propor-
tional representation? (2) Would there have been stronger support
for legalizing same-sex marriage in the U.K. House of Commons if
Parliament more closely reflected the population in gender and age?
∗The authors thank the associate editor (Justin Grimmer) and two anonymous reviewers
for helpful comments; Jennifer vanVeerde-Hudson and Rosie Campbell for sharing data; and
participants at the 2015 Midwest Political Science Association annual meetings for useful
feedback.
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1. INTRODUCTION
How would the voting outcomes of a legislature be different if it had more female
members (Simon and Palmer 2010; Bump 2015; Sides 2015), more working-class
members (Carnes 2012; Carnes and Lupu 2015), or more minority members
(Cameron, Epstein, and O’Halloran 1996)? Answering these kinds of questions
can help us understand existing variation in legislative voting and evaluate po-
tential institutional reforms.
While counterfactuals about systems of representation can be illuminating,
they can also be challenging to assess. A natural starting point is to estimate
a behavioral model of legislative voting as a function of gender, class, race,
or other features of interest, along with party and other predictors of voting
decisions. We then want to predict the voting outcomes in a counterfactual
legislature with a different distribution of legislator characteristics (e.g. more
females). Complications arise, however, because the change being considered
takes place at the aggregate level, while the model focuses on the individual level.
For simple cases with linear models one can generate appropriate predictions
(and confidence intervals) using algebra, but neither estimation nor inference is
straightforward for models involving nonlinearities and interactions. It can also
be challenging to incorporate the different kinds of uncertainty one can imagine
in such a comparison, including uncertainty about the model and about the
details of the counterfactual scenario being considered.
In this paper, we discuss a technique by which researchers can estimate
and analyze aggregate counterfactual outcomes using legislative voting data.
Our approach involves estimating a behavioral voting model and then using
post-stratification to simulate representation under counterfactual distributions
of legislator attributes. Post-stratification is most commonly used to address
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problems of statistical representation that arise in survey analysis with non-
response (Sa¨rndal and Lundstro¨m 2005) and small-area estimation (Gelman and
Little 1997; Park, Gelman, and Bafumi 2004). We suggest that this method is
also useful in the counterfactual analysis of political representation.1
The key assumption behind our approach is that the relationship between
legislator characteristics and legislator behavior would remain the same even as
the distribution of characteristics changes. We call this the behavioral stability
assumption. It is generally not testable and in many interesting counterfactual
scenarios it is unlikely to hold. Even when we do not expect the behavioral
stability assumption to hold, counterfactual exercises like the ones we carry out
in this paper can be useful for highlighting the first-order effects of potential
reforms, before any behavioral responses from voters, candidates, legislators
and parties take place. Our approach could also be extended to incorporate
the researcher’s assumptions about how behavior would change as a result of
particular reform efforts.
We apply the technique to two research questions. First, we consider how po-
larization in the U.S. Congress might change if state congressional delegations
were chosen by proportional representation, such that e.g. 30% of the Mas-
sachusetts delegation would be Republican if 30% of voters in Massachusetts
voted Republican. Our method shows that addressing party disproportionality
at the state level would have yielded a small but noticeable reduction in polar-
ization over the past twenty years, assuming that our behavioral model holds
in the counterfactual scenario; this reduction in polarization occurs basically
because relatively moderate Northeast Republicans and Southern Democrats
were under-represented in this period. Polarization would have been higher un-
1Multilevel regression with post-stratification for small area estimation involves estimating
a general model using all the data and then simulating from the model given the known
distribution of attributes for each small area. Our application is similar, except that in the
second (post-stratification) step we use a counterfactual distribution of attributes.
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der proportional representation in the 1960s, however. Second, we consider how
the voting outcome on the 2013 same-sex marriage bill in the U.K. House of
Commons might have been different if Parliament were more representative of
the population in terms of age and gender. We show that addressing the over-
representation of middle-aged men would probably have led to higher support
for legalizing same-sex marriage (though with considerable uncertainty). Al-
though the behavioral stability assumption is unlikely to strictly hold in either
case, we view these as useful starting points for assessing the aggregate impacts
of potential reforms.
The methods we discuss, if more broadly used, could improve the literature
on legislative voting and representation in three main ways. First, in many
cases researchers establish that legislator characteristics such as gender or class
predict voting behavior. Although such studies tend to imply that aggregate
changes in representation (due to e.g. changes in recruitment or campaign fi-
nance rules) would therefore have substantial impacts on aggregate legislative
outcomes, these studies often do not provide explicit counterfactual analysis that
illustrates the likely magnitude of these impacts. Our suggestions may encour-
age researchers to explicitly carry out these counterfactual analyses and thus
help readers interpret their results. Second, researchers who do provide these
counterfactuals often fail to grapple with the uncertainty in their estimates. We
identify three types of uncertainty that one can consider incorporating into coun-
terfactual analysis and provide a useful framework for incorporating them into
estimation. Third, our approach enables researchers to explore counterfactuals
that are not easily dealt with by examining single coefficients in a behavioral
model; post-stratification is a more suitable approach when there are multiple
features that change in the counterfactual and/or when those features enter into
the behavioral model non-linearly or with interactions.
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2. METHODS
Figure 1 provides a summary of the steps in our procedure for simulating coun-
terfactual representation. The first step is to build a model of how the legisla-
tor’s behavior of interest Yi (voting, fundraising, etc.) varies as a function of
the variables Xi whose distribution would be altered in the counterfactual sce-
nario being considered. This model should take the form of a probability model
p(Yi|Xi,Θ) describing the conditional distribution of the outcome as a func-
tion of the measured variables and estimated parameters Θ. While a variety of
modeling techniques could be applied here, multilevel models will be attractive
for many of the same reasons they are attractive elsewhere (Gelman and Little
1997; Park, Gelman, and Bafumi 2004). The most important reason is that
representation typically occurs within states, electoral districts, or other blocs,
but often particular types relevant to the counterfactual (e.g. Massachusetts
Republicans) are absent from the data. Multilevel models provide a frame-
work for incorporating the necessary assumptions to fill in these gaps while also
accounting for heterogeneity due to unobserved factors at the individual and
state/region levels.
The second step is to generate a post-stratification scheme that reflects
the counterfactual representation scenario. For legislative counterfactuals, this
means specifying the count Ns corresponding to each type s (e.g. Republicans
from New York; middle-aged female Conservatives) in the counterfactual legis-
lature.2 As in applications of multilevel regression and post-stratification (i.e.
MRP) to small-area estimation, each type s specifies values of all attributes Xi
in the behavioral model. One needs to specify the full joint distribution of all
the attributes in the behavioral model so that outcome values can be simulated
2These counts correspond to the weights typically used for post-stratification in the survey
context. Using weights rather than counts would correspond to a hypothetical “infinite”
legislature, where the granularity of individuals is ignored.
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1. Estimate a behavioral model for legislators of the form p(Y |X,Θ), yielding
posterior distribution p(Θ|Y,X).
2. Specify a post-stratification scheme either deterministically specifying a
counterfactual set of legislator types X or a probability distribution p(X)
from which each legislator’s type Xi will be drawn.
3. For each t ∈ 1, 2, . . . , T simulated legislatures of N legislators,
(a) Draw a realization of the behavioral model parameters from their
posterior distribution Θ ∼ p(Θ|Y,X)
(b) If the post-stratification scheme is probabilistic, draw a realization of
N legislator types X ∼ p(X)
(c) For each legislator i,
• Draw a realization of the legislative behavior Yi ∼ p(Yi|Xi,Θ)
(d) Characterize the aggregate behavior of all legislators in simulated
legislature t
4. Characterize the distribution of the aggregate behavior of all legislators
across T simulated legislatures.
Figure 1: Steps involved in estimating legislative behavior in a counterfactual
legislature under the behavioral stability assumption, which is that the relation-
ship between legislator characteristics and legislator behavior would remain the
same even as the distribution of characteristics changes. These steps can be
completed sequentially as above, or jointly via Bayesian simulation.
for each individual in the hypothetical legislature. In some applications, the
researcher may want to treat this distribution as deterministic, i.e. specifying
exactly how many of each type there will be in the counterfactual scenario; in
others, the researcher may want to incorporate uncertainty about the distribu-
tion of types in the counterfactual scenario. Our first example below illustrates
the first approach while the second illustrates the second.
The third step is to apply the behavioral model in the counterfactual leg-
islature characterized by the post-stratification scheme and record the aggre-
gate outcomes. The resulting predictions will accurately characterize outcomes
in the counterfactual legislature only to the extent that the behavioral model
p(Y |X,Θ) estimated from observed behavior also applies under the counterfac-
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tual distribution of legislator types. This is the behavioral stability assumption.
The fourth and final step is to characterize the distribution of these outcomes
over many simulations. The variation in aggregate outcomes across simulations
will reflect three logically distinct sources of uncertainty that could be incorpo-
rated into the analysis. The first of these is model uncertainty, or uncertainty
about parameters: how certain are we about how behavior varies as a function
of representatives’ attributes? This is taken into account in step 3a of Figure 1
either by simulating draws from the normal approximation to the MLE of the
probability model (Gelman and King 1994; King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000)
or by simulating draws from the Bayesian posterior of the probability model
given some priors. The second source of uncertainty is post-stratification uncer-
tainty, or uncertainty about the distribution of types: how certain are we about
the prevalence of various relevant characteristics (e.g. party, gender) in the coun-
terfactual legislature? This is taken into account in step 3b by drawing a new
set of types from the probability distribution over Ns in each simulation. Third
is finite-legislature uncertainty, or uncertainty about outcomes conditional on
parameters and types: how uncertain are we about legislative outcomes (e.g. the
results of a single roll call or the overall level of polarization) given that those
outcomes are aggregated from individual realizations of a stochastic model for
each of a finite number of hypothetical legislators? This is taken into account in
step 3c by drawing outcomes for each legislator from the estimated p(Yi|Xi,Θ)
rather than deterministically setting the outcome for each member of the coun-
terfactual legislature to E(Yi|Xi,Θ). Depending on the application, it may not
be necessary to incorporate all of these types of uncertainty into the simulation,
but the relevance of each to the desired counterfactual should be considered.
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3. EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS
3.1. Polarization in the U.S. Congress under State-Level Proportional
Representation
As a first example of the kind of analysis we propose, we examine how polar-
ization in the U.S. House of Representatives would differ if state congressional
delegations were formed based on party proportional representation (PR) rather
than on district-level plurality results. The basic approach is to model vot-
ing behavior as a function of party and state characteristics, and to use post-
stratification to estimate counterfactual outcomes in a legislature in which the
number of Republicans and Democrats in each state delegation reflects state-
level voting patterns.
At the outset we note that the behavioral stability assumption introduced
above is unlikely to hold in this counterfactual scenario. If congressional elec-
tions were based on state-wide PR, we might expect different candidates to be
nominated and elected, different incentives for logrolling and strategic voting in
the legislature, and different kinds of bills coming up for votes; each of these
changes would violate the behavioral stability assumption. The counterfactual
scenario we consider does not address any of these possible indirect effects of
changing the current system of representation. Still, this and other similar coun-
terfactual exercises clarify how individual-level behavioral variation relates to
aggregate features of representation (e.g., are moderates under-represented, and
to what extent?) while also giving insight into the first-order effects of possible
reforms.3
We focus on legislators’ DW-NOMINATE scores (Poole and Rosenthal 1997),
3One can make an analogy to Duverger’s classic distinction between mechanical and psy-
chological effects: a change in the electoral system affects electoral outcomes through both
channels, but studying each in isolation yields insights nonetheless (Duverger 1954).
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which we model as a function of state-party means.4 Because some states have
single-party delegations, we cannot fit a fully-saturated regression model in-
cluding all of the state-party interactions; even if we could fit such a model, it
would perform poorly because most delegations are too small to provide much
information about the state-specific means. Instead, we pool information across
different states by modeling the state-party means hierarchically as a function
of region, state-level presidential Democratic vote share Pj and congressional
Democratic vote share Cj in the preceding election, for each party p. Thus,
where j(i) is the state j of representative i, and r(j) is the region (Northeast,
South, Midwest, West) of state j,
Yi ∼ N
(
αj(i),p, σp
)
(1)
αj,p ∼ N
(
δr(j),p + β1,pPj + β2,pCj , ωp
)
(2)
In words, the average DW-NOMINATE score for legislators from a given state
and party is modeled as a linear function of the presidential and congressional
voting outcomes in that state, with slope coefficients that vary by party and
an intercept that varies by region and party. Clearly the behavioral model
could be altered in various ways. We could, for example, allow nonlinearities in
the relationship between electoral outcomes and voting behavior, or incorporate
other predictors of congressional voting behavior such as measures of the relative
locations of parties across state legislatures (Shor and McCarty 2011).
For the post-stratification stage of the simulation, we specify the distribution
of seats across parties in the counterfactual PR legislature by applying the
D’Hondt method5 to party vote shares in the previous congressional election in
4See Eggers and Lauderdale 2015, the replication archive for the analysis in this paper.
5The D’Hondt method of proportional representation is used to allocate seats in many PR
systems including Spain, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Japan.
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the state.6 We chose to carry out the post-stratification step deterministically:
we simply applied the formula to fixed electoral results to calculate the implied
party composition as if the state-level party vote shares would not have changed
under PR.7 We then simulate 4,000 legislatures for each Congress from the 87th
to the 112th, incorporating behavioral model uncertainty and finite legislature
uncertainty through the Bayesian posterior simulation of the model.
In Figure 2 we show the trends in polarization, as measured by the dis-
tance between the average Republican and average Democrat. It has been well
documented that polarization has risen over this period (McCarty, Poole, and
Rosenthal 2006). Figure 2 shows that a large increase also would have taken
place under the PR simulation over the same period, but with important dif-
ferences. First, since about 1995 Congress would been less polarized in our PR
counterfactual: in particular, the gap between the average Democrat and the
average Republican would have been about 5% smaller. (Put differently, the
increase in that gap between 1994 and 2010 would have been about 25% lower.)
Second, between about 1975 and 1995 polarization would have been about the
same in the actual and the counterfactual scenario. Third, before 1975 a hypo-
thetical PR Congress would have been more polarized than the actual Congress
was.
To explain these patterns, consider Figure 3. The left panel shows the av-
erage ideal point of Democrats and Republicans by region (South, Northeast,
Midwest, and West) as estimated by our model. It shows that northern Repub-
6We also ran the simulation using presidential vote shares, with similar results. A possible
downside to using congressional results is that some races are uncontested and others are so
lopsided that turnout and results may diverge from voting under a hypothetical PR system.
The presidential and congressional results are most dissimilar in the 1960s, when Republican
presidential candidates were popular in the South but southern congressional delegations
remained solidly Democratic.
7To incorporate post-stratification uncertainty, we would need a probabilistic model for
the state-level vote shares under PR because D’Hondt is deterministic given vote shares; this
model might then also include assumptions about how the state-level vote shares would change
under PR.
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Figure 2: The left plot shows the distance between the average Republican
and average Democrat as measured by DW-NOMINATE score, from the 87th
to the 112th Congress, using the actual Congresses (black) and hypothetical
Congresses elected by PR (blue). The 95% posterior bands around each line
reflect uncertainty in the behavioral model and finite legislature uncertainty.
The right plot shows the simulated effect of switching to PR on distance between
the average Republican and average Democrat.
licans and (especially in the early period) southern Democrats have consistently
been more moderate than their co-partisans in the other regions throughout the
period we examine. The right panel shows the extent to which Republicans
have been over-represented (and thus Democrats have been under -represented)
in each region over time, compared to the PR counterfactual.8 The most striking
pattern relates to the South (dotted line): southern Republicans were consis-
tently under-represented compared to PR (and thus southern Democrats were
over-represented) until the early 1990s, at which point Republicans came to be
over-represented (and thus Democrats were under-represented). Over the same
period, the Republicans went from being over-represented in the Northeast to
8These are shown relative to the mean over-representation in each election, which fluctuates
substantially across elections because of the high responsiveness of the seats-votes curve. For
the plot, we smooth the election-specific figures using a local linear regression with a normal
kernel with a bandwidth (sd) of 4 years.
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Figure 3: The left panel shows mean party position by region and party; north-
ern Republicans and southern Democrats have consistently been more moder-
ate than the rest of their party. The right panel shows the (smoothed) degree
to which Republicans are over-represented in each region compared to a PR
counterfactual, controlling for the overall level of Republican over- (or under-)
representation in a given election. Democrats tended to be over-represented in
the South before the 1990s and under-represented since then.
being under-represented. Combining this pattern with the one shown in the left
panel of Figure 3, we can explain why (as we saw in Figure 2) polarization in our
PR counterfactual is higher than the observed level of polarization in the 1960s
but lower since about 1990: proportional representation makes outcomes more
polarized in the 1960s primarily by curtailing the overrepresentation of moderate
Democrats from southern states and moderate Republicans from northeastern
states, while it makes outcomes less polarized since the 1990s by addressing the
underrepresentation of moderate Democrats from southern states and moderate
Republicans from northeastern states.
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3.2. Voting on the U.K. Same-Sex Couples Act Under Improved Descriptive
Representation by Age and Gender
As a second application of these methods, we consider a specific vote in the
U.K. House of Commons.9 On February 5, 2013, the House of Commons held
its key vote on the passage of the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Bill, which
proposed to legalize same-sex marriage in England and Wales. Each of the
main party leaders offered a “free vote”, meaning they did not formally instruct
their MPs how to vote. As a result, and unusually for the House of Commons,
voting revealed substantial internal disagreement within the parties: the bill
was supported by 42% of Conservative MPs, 81% of Labour MPs, and 78% of
Liberal Democrats (with the remainder either opposing or abstaining).
A cursory examination of the voting results indicates that female MPs were
more likely to support the measure (74% support among female MPs compared
to 57% among males) as were younger MPs (73% support among MPs under 40
compared to 59% among those 40); this suggests that support for the same-sex
marriage bill might have been higher if the well-known under-representation
of women and young people in the House of Commons were addressed. Our
method is appropriate for assessing that conjecture.
As in the example of the previous section, we need two main elements to
proceed: (1) a behavioral voting model that characterizes MPs’ votes as a func-
tion of their characteristics, and (2) a counterfactual joint distribution of these
characteristics that captures an alternative representation scheme. For our be-
havioral model, we fit a logistic regression model with party, sex, and age group
(under 40, 40-59, 60 and over) without interactions.10 We examine a counterfac-
9For data on MPs’ age and gender, we used Hudson and Campbell 2015.
10We also estimated a fully saturated interaction model, estimating the level of support for
MPs in all of the 4 x 2 x 3 intersections of party, sex and age group. The results were nearly
identical, as the logistic model fits the MP voting data remarkably well.
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tual representation scheme in which the relative strengths of the different parties
is held the same, but the joint distribution of age and gender within each party
is changed to the distribution we observe for that party in the electorate; that
is, we examine a situation in which Labour MPs look like 2010 Labour voters
in terms of age and gender, while the overall share of Labour MPs is held the
same, and likewise for the other parties.11 We estimate the distributions of age
and sex for supporters of each party using the 2010 BES post-election survey. In
the counterfactual simulation, we do not fix the exact sex and age distribution
for each party, but draw simulated MPs from that distribution, reflecting the
fact that even if MPs were drawn from a pool that was representative of party
supporters in terms of age and sex, absent a strict quota system there would not
be an exact distributional match in any particular Parliament. Thus variation
in outcomes across our 100,000 simulations of counterfactual parliaments voting
on same-sex marriage reflects not just behavioral model uncertainty and finite
legislature uncertainty (as in the previous example) but also post-stratification
uncertainty.
The counterfactual analysis yields a mean posterior estimate of 65% support,
with a 95% interval from 59% to 70%. In 88% of simulated votes the overall
support is higher than the level of actual support for the bill (61%). We also
carried out simulations in which we drew the distribution of age and gender
by party from the observed joint distribution in the existing parliament. The
95% interval of the resulting distribution of voting outcomes runs from 56%
to 66% support; in 81% of simulations the level of support was higher with
the counterfactual distribution of age and gender by party than with the actual
distribution. Thus taking into account uncertainty about model parameters, the
distribution of types in the parliament, and the votes MPs cast, we have reason
11Alternatively, we could have adjusted the party seat shares to be proportional to vote
shares (as in our first example) or adjusted for gender and age without holding fixed the
relative party strengths.
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Figure 4: Age-gender categories that were relatively unsupportive of same-sex
marriage tended to be over-represented in Parliament. The horizontal axis in-
dicates each type of MP’s predicted probability of supporting the same-sex
marriage bill; the vertical axis indicates the difference between that type’s share
of a counterfactual Parliament that reflects the population in terms of age and
sex (by party) and the actual Parliament.
to expect that there would be higher support for the same-sex marriage bill
in Parliament if MPs more closely reflected the population in terms of gender
and age, but the difference in expectation is not so large that we can be very
confident of such a difference for any particular counterfactual Parliament.
Figure 4 helps explain the aggregate increase in support we see in our coun-
terfactual simulations. For each type of MP (defined by party, gender, and age
group), we show on the horizontal axis the estimated probability of support-
ing the bill and on the vertical axis the difference between the counterfactual
share of that type and the actual share of that type (i.e. the change in weight
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between the two scenarios). By far the most over-represented group is Conser-
vative males between 40 and 59 years of age (labeled “CM5”); the most under-
represented group is Conservative females over 60 (“CM7”).12 The reason we
see the aggregate increase in support is that within each party the counterfactual
scenario tends to involve down-weighting types that are relatively unsupport-
ive of same-sex marriage (middle-aged men) and up-weighting types that are
relatively supportive (women and MPs under 40).
Interestingly, this example serves as a reminder that improving descriptive
representation need not improve the congruence between legislative behavior
and public opinion. Recall that support among the public was around 55%,
while support in the actual House of Commons was 61%; the expected level
of support in a counterfactual House of Commons that was more descriptively
representative with respect to age and gender is 65%. Thus addressing a lack of
representativeness in terms of age and gender would tend to make the legislature
less representative of public opinion on this particular issue. One possible expla-
nation for this is that by making Parliament more descriptively representative
in terms of age and gender, we have not addressed other descriptive dimensions
(such as education and religious belief) where the unrepresentativeness of MPs
tends to make them more favorable towards same-sex marriage.13
4. CONCLUSION
The statistical methods we have discussed in this paper offer a convenient way to
communicate the implications of models of legislative behavior and to investigate
12Recall that we hold party shares fixed in this counterfactual analysis, so the degree of
over-representation across groups within a party must sum to zero.
13Another explanation is one that arises in all assessments of congruence between public
opinion and legislative voting: voting in Parliament is different from responding to a survey.
It may be that our exercise has brought support in Parliament closer to what would have
happened if a random sample of the population were actually asked to vote on the issue in
Parliament.
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the first-order impacts of possible institutional reforms, subject to the soundness
of our behavioral model. These methods also allow us to convey our uncertainty
about these implications.
These methods do not, of course, liberate the researcher from the usual dif-
ficulties of trying to say something about hypothetical scenarios. The approach
we have highlighted tells us what would happen in a counterfactual legislature
if the behavioral stability assumption holds: that is, if individual legislators’
behavior remains the same even as the mix of legislators is altered. Of course,
a huge literature on legislative politics tells us that agenda setting and legisla-
tive voting behavior would change in response to changes in the composition
of the legislature. When the behavioral stability assumption seems unlikely to
hold, researchers should adopt a more cautious interpretation of the results of
counterfactual analysis: one might see the results as a measure of the first-order
effects of a reform, or even as a way of interpreting the parameters of a behav-
ioral model using illustrative hypothetical scenarios. Alternatively, if one has
clear expectations about how a given reform would affect legislative behavior,
one could relax the behavioral stability assumption and build these expectations
into the model, extending the procedure we introduced above. While the meth-
ods we present do not solve any of the usual problems of counterfactual analysis,
we hope that they do allow researchers to be clearer about the assumptions and
implications of their counterfactual analyses.
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